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I. INTRODUCTION
Government records fill up boxes, filing cabinets, and hard
drives across Louisiana. They are the evidence, the breadcrumbs,
the snail slime trails that show where government has been and in
what direction it is heading. Most seem innocuous enough-forms,
license applications, or property tax assessments-just a narrow
slice of the government decision-making process that fuels the
routine paper-pushing of a bureaucracy. But all public records are
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not created equal. The higher up the bureaucratic food chain it was
generated, the more likely that a public record will involve a
decision that has real-life ramifications for a wider audience. A
neighbor's property tax assessment is small beans. A proposal to
raise the homestead exemption for all Louisiana property owners is
a big deal.
People paid attention, then, when Governor Bobby Jindal
proposed legislation in 2009 to rework the way public records law
applies to the governor's office. Of the mountains of public records
in this state, the governor's have some of the highest value. A
governor is elected, in large part, to make decisions that affect the
entire state. Governor Jindal swept into office in 2008 on a wave of
voter dissatisfaction over perceived government mismanagement
during Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.' He declared a "war on
corruption and incompetence in government"; 2 then, in his first
year of office, he fought and won an entrenched battle with the
Louisiana Legislature over changes to the state's ethics rules.3
In 2009, Governor Jindal turned his attention to the availability
of public records in his own office.4 The governor's representatives
touted the measure as a "transformational" move toward greater
transparency in government.5 The opposition thought differently,
to put it mildly. Critics described the governor's rhetoric as
Copyright 2011, by KEVIN M. BLANCHARD.
1. Adam Nossiter, An Improbable Favorite Emerges in Cajun Country,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2007, at 17A, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/
10/19/us/191ouisiana.html.
2. Bobby Jindal, Governor Jindal's Inaugural Address, OFF. OF THE
GOVERNOR (Jan. 14, 2008), http://gov.louisiana.gov/index.cfm?articlelD=24&
md=newsroom&tmp=detail.
3. Robert Travis Scott, Watchdog Seeks Reversal of Change in Ethics Law;
Standard of Prooffor Violations at Issue, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.),
May 1, 2008, at 4A, available at http://www.nola.com/news/t-p/capitallindex.
ssf?/base/news-6/1209620079213470.xml&coll=1. The politically charged fight
over those ethics rules overshadowed a slight change to the public records law in
2008. At Jindal's urging, the legislature disallowed those agencies under the
governor's office from being able to claim the governor's blanket exemption
from public records law. Act No. 765, § 3, 2008 La. Acts 2925, 2926 ("The
provisions of this Section shall not apply to any agency transferred or placed
within the office of the governor.").
4. Hearing on SB 278 Before the Senate and Gov. Affairs Comm., 2009
Reg. Sess. (La. May 6, 2009) [hereinafter Senate Hearing], available at
http://senate.legis.state.1a.usNideo/default.asp; see also Public Records in the
Office of the Governor (2009) (PowerPoint presentation by the Governor's
Office, on file with the author and available from the Senate and Governmental
Affairs Committee) (describing the measure as the governor's proposal).
5. Ed Anderson, Jindal Vetoes Bill to Create a 'Homeless Czar'; Governor
Concerned by Effect on Budget, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), July 8,
2009, at 2A.
704 [Vol. 71
2011] COMMENT 705
Orwellian 6 and called the bill "a devastating blow to open
government."7 Newspaper editorials described the bill as "ill-
considered and dangerous" and wondered what the governor "has
to hide."9 One legislator, state Senator Robert Adley, Jindal's
fellow Republican, said the bill would result in Louisiana being
more closed than a Communist state like Cuba." The bill, Adley
said, would "take the state of Louisiana from sunshine to
moonshine."l 2
Governor Jindal and his legislative allies prevailed over the
heated rhetoric.' 3 On the surface, the resulting language of Act 495
amends Louisiana Revised Statutes section 44:5 in a truly
6. James Gill, Op-Ed., Doublespeak, with a Louisiana Accent, TIMES-
PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), July 22, 2009, at 7B, available at
http://blog.nola.com/jamesgill/2009/07/jamesgill-ingov-bobbyjindal.html
("Our current administration has evidently been inspired by the Ministry of
Truth to turn words on their heads and bamboozle the masses. In '1984,' War is
Peace, Freedom is Slavery, and Ignorance is Strength. In Baton Rouge today,
Secrecy is Transparency. . . . Only a few legislators protest at the brainwashing
of the proles.").
7. PAR Says Public Records Bill Would Stifle Open Government, PUB.
AFF. RES. COUNCIL OF LA. (June 17, 2009), http://www.la-par.org/article.cfn?id
=268&cateid=2.
8. Editorial, ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, La.), June 18, 2009, at 8B.
9. Editorial, ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, La.), June 26, 2009, at 8B.
10. Adley is a Republican from Benton, La. who served as the Vice-
Chairman of the Senate Revenue & Fiscal Affairs Committee. See Louisiana
State Senate-Robert Adley, LA. ST. SENATE, http://senate.legis.state.1a.us/
Adley/ (last visited Dec. 13, 2010).
11. Mark Ballard, Op-Ed., Open Should Mean Open, ADVOCATE (Baton
Rouge, La.), May 10, 2009, at 7B, available at http://www.2theadvocate.com/
blogs/politicsblog/44643182.html (quoting state Senator Robert Adley: "He's
making horrible arguments and the Legislature, because of all the lobbying he's
doing, is swallowing the whole thing. . . . Transparency is gone. Checks and
balances are gone. I'm beginning to believe I'm sitting in a communist state.");
Marsha Shuler, Governor's Office Records Access Bill Gets Final Approval,
ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, La.), June 25, 2009, at 6A, available at http://www.
2theadvocate.com/news/49054976.html.
12. Shuler, supra note 11. Adley was part of a group of state legislators,
including Representative Wayne Waddell, a Republican from Shreveport, who
championed competing legislation.
13. In 2010, legislators attempted to heavily amend Louisiana Revised
Statutes section 44:5, but the attempt died. Bill Barrow, Governor's Office
Records Bill Advances over Bobby Jindal's Objection, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New
Orleans, La.), May 26, 2010, available at http://www.nola.com/politics/index.
ssf/2010/05/senatecommitteeapprovesgove.html. Another bill requiring the
governor to disclose records from his office dealing with the BP oil spill passed
the Louisiana Legislature but did not survive a veto from Governor Bobby
Jindal. Mark Ballard, Jindal Vetoes Bill Opening Oil Leak Records, ADVOCATE
(Baton Rouge, La.), June 26, 2010, at 6A, available at http://www.2theadvocate.
com/news/97210804.html.
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unprecedented manner. The old version of Section 44:5 gave a
near blanket exemption to records of the governor.14 The new
version appears to remove that blanket, declaring that records of
the governor are now subject to disclosure unless certain
exemptions apply.' 5 But the language in the statute is subject to
several interpretations, meaning that courts will be faced with
choices of interpretation that could indeed result in a less-not
more-transparent government.
Act 495 exempts from disclosure those records that (1) are
intra-office communications; (2) relate to the deliberative process
of the governor; (3) relate to the governor's schedule or security
(or that of his family); or (4) contain pre-decisional advice and
recommendations to the governor concerning the budget.16 Each of
these categories raises issues that Louisiana courts will have to
address in the future.
The statutory deliberative process privilege allows the
governor to fight the disclosure of any government record used in
his decision-making process, even if that record is located outside
the governor's office.17 Some scholars criticize the very concept of
the deliberative process privilege as eroding the "power 8 and
effectiveness of the citizens who we regard as sovereigns."' By
adopting the phrase "deliberative process," the legislature has
attempted to implicate a body of law interpreting a particular
exemption under the federal Freedom of Information Act
14. Act No. 195, § 5, 1940 La. Acts 832, 834-35 ("That the provisions of
this Act shall not apply to any books, records, writings, accounts, letters, letter
books, photographs or copies thereof ordinarily kept in the custody or control of
the Governor of the State of Louisiana in the usual course of the duties and
business of his office; provided that the provisions of this section shall not be
construed to prevent any person otherwise herein authorized so to do from
examining and copying any books, records, papers, accounts or other documents
pertaining to any money or moneys or any financial transactions in the control
of or handled by or through the Governor of the State of Louisiana.").
15. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44:5 (Supp. 2010).
16. Id. § 44:5(A).
17. Id. § 44:5(B)(1).
18. Gerald Wetlaufer, Justifying Secrecy: An Objection to the General
Deliberative Privilege, 65 IND. L.J. 845, 892-93 (1990) ("[E]xecutive secrecy
operates to disempower citizens by depriving them of the information that they
may need in order [to] effectively promote their interests.... Additionally, the
establishment of the general deliberative privilege will operate to diminish the
sense of accountability under which executive officials do their business. That
diminished sense of accountability may increase the likelihood that the official
will act in a way that is sloppy or incompetent, that he will confuse his own self-
interest (or that of a particular constituency) with the interests of the public, or
that he will engage in various kinds of bad acts with which he would not want to
be publicly associated.").
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(FOIA).19 But it is not quite the clean fit the legislature might have
envisioned. 20 Left unsettled is whether Louisiana courts will or
should embrace all the various intricacies in FOIA jurisprudence or
craft solutions more faithful to Louisiana's historically liberal
public records doctrine.
Under Act 495, the governor will also be able to deny access to
"intra-office communications" between himself and his staff.2 1
Courts will have to decide just what types of communications
qualify for this exemption, as a broad interpretation will result in
this "new" addition to the statute amounting to little more than a
smaller version of the governor's prior custody-based exemption. 22
Act 495 also inserts into public records law a six-month
privilege against the release of records, "limited to pre-decisional
advice and recommendations" made to the governor concerning
the state's budget process.23 Certain budgetary information that has
always been discoverable in the past may now be withheld from
public scrutiny.24 The scope of this budgetary privilege-to which
documents it can be applied, by whom it may be applied, and to
what extent factual information can be withheld-could be wide or
narrow, depending on how courts interpret the provision.
The governor's schedule is also off limits-even, apparently,
his past schedule. 25 Although this result clearly reflects legislative
intent, it raises public policy concerns, as a governor is now
permitted to hold secret, yet official meetings with whomever he
wishes-withholding both the communications and the
communicators. The public deserves assurances that future
governors cannot carry on meaningful public business in complete
secrecy.
Finally, Act 495 raises an interesting dilemma: are governors
now required to archive records, rather than shred them upon
leaving office? One reading of the new law seems to allow
governors to shield forever the documents that they independently
deem as revealing of their deliberative process, denying potentially
valuable and enlightening information to historians and future
26generations.
Although none of the above possible interpretations would
comport with the stated intent of the supporters of the bill to open
19. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (2006); see discussion infra Part IV.A.1.
20. See discussion infra Part IV.A. 1.
21. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44:5(A).
22. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
23. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44:5(B)(2).
24. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
25. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44:5(A).
26. See discussion infra Part IV.F.
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more records to public view, the newness of this statute-and the
introduction of the deliberative process privilege into Louisiana
law-provide courts an opportunity. Because they will be
operating from a near-blank slate of controlling jurisprudence,
however, Louisiana courts can and should choose those
interpretations that will best promote the state's constitutionally
based public policy of openness.
Part II of this Comment will review the legal history and policy
behind the public's access to government information and explore
the concept of "deliberative process" in the federal context. Part III
will discuss the history and development of Louisiana's public
records law as it applies to the governor, concluding with a wrap-up
of the provisions of Act 495. Part IV will propose interpretations
Louisiana courts may adopt, and changes the Legislature should
consider making, in order to protect the public's right to access
information used by its government to reach decisions.
II. THE PUBLIC'S RIGHT TO ACCESS IN THE FEDERAL CONTEXT:
FOIA, EXEMPTION 5, AND THE DELIBERATIVE PROCESS PRIVILEGE
A. The Constitutional Right to Know: "A River Without Water"28
To be clear, the people have no affirmative, federal
constitutional "right to know" what is contained in the records of
the Governor of Louisiana-or any public official. 29 Despite its
recognition in the Pentagon Papers case that the government bears
the heaviest of burdens when it seeks to place prior restraints on
the publication of information, 30 the U.S. Supreme Court in Pell v.
Procunier acknowledged that neither the public nor the press has a
constitutional guarantee to gather information from the
27. LA. CONST. art. XII, § 3 ("No person shall be denied the right to observe
the deliberations of public bodies and examine public documents, except in
cases established by law.").
28. In re Mack, 126 A.2d 679, 689 (Pa. 1956) (Musmanno, J., dissenting)
("A print shop without material to print would be as meaningless as a vineyard
without grapes, an orchard without trees, or a lawn without verdue. Freedom of
the press means freedom to gather news, write it, publish it, and circulate it.
When any one of these integral operations is interdicted, freedom of the press
becomes a river without water.").
29. The Louisiana Constitution acknowledges a general right to know, but
qualifies that right by providing that "no person shall be denied the right to ...
examine public documents, except in cases established by law." LA. CONST. art.
XII, § 3.
30. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States (Pentagon Papers), 403 U.S. 713, 714
(1971).
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government. Months after writing Pell, Justice Stewart
expounded on his view in a speech at Yale Law School.32 The
Constitution frees the press, Stewart said, to "do battle against
secrecy and deception in government. But the press cannot expect
from the Constitution any guarantee that it will succeed."3 Thus,
the public, through the press, has only an "indirect" protection of
its right to know about government doings.34
Although not established as a constitutional right, the public's
right to know still deserves special reverence for the role it plays in
self-governing democracy. Professor Alexander Meiklejohn argued
that the First Amendment protects self-government by helping the
public retain control over its government.35 He wrote that without
the ability to both share and gather information about their
government, people cannot intelligently participate in the
democratic process.36 One author combined Meiklejohn's
argument for effective self-government with the idea that the press
must act as a "fundamental check" on government power and
excess, arguing that the public has a need for liberal access to the
information used in the government's decision-making process.3 7
Under settled constitutional law, though, what results is a "river
without water"-a nearly limitless right to publish information, but
no established right of the public or press to tap into that
information at its source.38 But even if the Constitution does not
provide a way to fill that riverbed, in the last few decades
legislative bodies have constructed, by statute, river lock
mechanisms that allow for varying degrees of flow.
31. 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974) ("[T]here is no constitutional right to have
access to particular government information, or to require openness from the
bureaucracy."). Justice Douglas countered in dissent that the public's "right to
know is crucial to the governing powers of the people." Id. at 839 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (citing Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972)); see also Potter
Stewart, "Or of the Press, " 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631 (1975).
32. Sigman L. Splichal, The Right to Know, in ACCESS DENIED: FREEDOM
OF INFORMATION IN AN INFORMATION AGE 3, 10 (Charles N. Davis & Sigman L.
Splichal eds., 2000).
33. Stewart, supra note 31, at 636. Justice Stewart added that "[t]he
Constitution itself is neither a Freedom of Information Act nor an Official
Secrets Act." Id.
34. Id
35. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 89-94 (1948).
36. Id.
37. Splichal, supra note 32, at 10 (synthesizing Meiklejohn's theory that
effective, intelligent self-government requires citizens to have the ability to
gather and share information about their government and Vincent Blasi's
argument that the press must act as a counter-weight to government power).
38. In re Mack, 126 A.2d 679, 689 (Pa. 1956) (Musmanno, J., dissenting).
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B. Statutory Solutions to the Right ofPublic Access to Information
Congress began focusing on statutory remedies to allow public
access to government information in part because of a movement
sparked by the 1953 work The People's Right to Know by media
attorney Harold Cross. 39 Cross detailed the dismal state of public
records law across the country, calling for stronger laws to grant
access to public records. 40 The public, Cross believed, has a "legal
right to examine and investigate the conduct of its affairs, subject
only to those limitations imposed by the most urgent public
necessity.' l Cross's book helped fuel a movement in Congress to
reform early federal public access laws-then used more as a
shield to disclosure-into reasonable and effective means to gain
information.4 2
In 1966, Congress enacted FOIA to govern the release of
information from federal agencies.43 FOIA purports to "ensure an
informed citizenry, vital to the functioning of a democratic society,
needed to check against corruption and to hold the governors
accountable to the governed."' Each state deals with access to
information in different ways.45 Some states have closely modeled
46their statues after FOIA. Others, like Louisiana, either adopted
39. Splichal, supra note 32, at 18.
40. See generally HAROLD L. CROSS, THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO KNOW:
LEGAL ACCESS TO PUBLIC RECORDS AND PROCEEDINGS (1953). The preface to
Cross's book, which was commissioned by the American Society of Newspaper
Editors, begins: "Public business is the public's business. The people have the
right to know. Freedom of Information is their just heritage. Without that the
citizens of a democracy have but changed their kings." Id. at xiii.
41. Id.
42. Splichal, supra note 32, at 17.
43. Id. at 18.
44. NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978).
45. See REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, OPEN
GOVERNMENT GUIDE (2006), available at http://www.rcfp.org/ogg/index.php.
The guide is a compilation of public records and open meetings law compiled by
attorneys from each state. The online version of the guide is searchable.
46. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 84 (McKinney 2009); W. VA. CODE §
29B-1-1 (2009). In addition, many courts have recognized the usefulness, or
lack thereof, of using FOIA jurisprudence to aid the interpretation of state public
records laws. See, e.g., Bowers v. Shelton, 453 S.E.2d 741 (Ga. 1995) (stating
that Georgia's Open Records Act, enacted before FOIA, "materially differs"
from FOIA); Fink v. Lefkowitz, 393 N.E.2d 463 (N.Y. 1979) (stating that New
York's Freedom of Information Law was patterned after FOIA); State ex rel.
Findlay Publ'g Co. v. Schroeder, 669 N.E.2d 835 (Ohio 1996) (stating that
Ohio's public records exemptions were not patterned after FOIA, and as such,
FOIA cannot provide an interpretative model); Daily Gazette v. W. Va. Dev.
Office, 521 S.E.2d 543 (W. Va. 1999) (recognizing that the similarities with
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their laws before FOIA or do not follow FOIA's general
structure. 47 Louisiana, like most states, sometimes looks to on-
point FOIA jurisprudence for guidance when its own courts have
yet to address a similar provision of state public records law.48
On the state level, public records law has developed into what
one author calls a "crazy quilt of definitions, exemptions and
judicial interpretations." 4 Because each state develops its own
body of law-through statutes or cases or both-under its own
unique political climate and historical development, finding
common threads among the states can be a daunting, if not
impossible, task.5 o In general, though, there are two approaches:
either a FOIA-like approach, with a handful of subjective
exemptions open to court interpretation, or a Louisiana-like statute
that presumes all records are public unless they neatly fit into one
of many specific statutory exemptions.5 1
C. FOIA Exemption 5's Deliberative Process Protection
The deliberative process privilege, an offshoot of the more
"glamorous" executive privilege, has greatly affected the everyday
functioning of government over the last decades. 52 Court cases
before the adoption of FOIA established the idea that disclosing
FOIA give value to federal precedent when interpreting the West Virginia
Freedom of Information Act).
47. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-121 (2001); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 44:1 (2007).
48. See Angelo lafrate Constr., LLC v. State, 879 So. 2d 250 (La. Ct. App.
1st 2004) (pointing out that similarities between the Louisiana Constitution's
right-to-privacy clause and FOIA's exemption for documents that constitute an
invasion of privacy make federal cases interpreting privacy rights under FOIA
"instructive"); Trahan v. Larivee, 365 So. 2d 294 (La. Ct. App. 3d 1978) ("[W]e
next turn to the jurisprudence which may assist us in determining the issue
herein. Finding no Louisiana cases on this issue, we turn to the federal cases for
their treatment of the subject."); see also Landis v. Moreau, 779 So. 2d 691 (La.
2001). But see Capital City Press v. E. Baton Rouge Metro. Council, 696 So. 2d
562 (La. 1997) (noting that although FOIA and 34 other states might disallow
the disclosure of public job applications, Louisiana public records law contained
no such exemption, so other jurisprudence was not helpful).
49. Splichal, supra note 32, at 19.
50. Id.
51. See generally REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, supra
note 45.
52. Russell L. Weaver & James T.R. Jones, The Deliberative Process
Privilege, 54 Mo. L. REV. 279, 279 (1989); see Maine v. Norton, 208 F. Supp.
2d 63, 66 (D. Me. 2002) ("The most frequently invoked privilege incorporated
within Exemption 5 is the deliberative process privilege.").
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the internal deliberative process of agencies might result in
inhibited discussion and lower-quality decisions. 53 Courts have
held that Congress intended to incorporate that same deliberative
process privilege into FOIA through Exemption 5,54 which protects
from disclosure "inter-agency . . . memorandums or letters which
would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in
litigation with the agency."55 The purpose behind the exemption,
according to the jurisprudence, is to let government withhold
documents "reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and
deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental
decisions and polices are formulated." 56 Congress was concerned
that the "frank discussion of legal or policy matters in writing
might be inhibited if the discussion were made public; and that the
decisions and policies formulated would be the poorer as a
result."57 This "chilling" effect has been criticized as unsupported
by any empirical study, or even by anecdote. 8 Frequent litigation
53. See Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1 (1938); Kaiser Aluminum &
Chem. Corp. v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 939, 946 (Ct. Cl. 1958) (retired
Justice Reed writing for the federal Court of Claims). Authors have written
extensively about the "roots" of the deliberative process privilege, whether its
origins are more likely derived from the common law or the Constitution. See,
e.g., RAOUL BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTrfUTIONAL MYTH (1974);
Weaver & Jones, supra note 52, at 288-90.
54. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 86 (1973).
55. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (2006).
56. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 150 (1975); see also
Int'l Paper Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 438 F.2d 1349, 1358-59 (2d Cir. 1971);
Kaiser, 157 F. Supp. at 946. The purpose of the privilege is to protect (1)
"creative debate and candid consideration of alternatives within an agency"; (2)
"the public from the confusion that would result from premature exposure to
discussions occurring" before the policy decision was made; and (3) "the
integrity of the decision-making process itself," because "officials should be
judged by what they decided, not for matters they considered before making up
their minds." Jordan v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 591 F.2d 753, 772-73 (D.C. Cir.
1978). Act 495 sponsor, state Senator Jody Amedee, a Democrat from Gonzales,
made reference to this passage during legislative testimony on the bill in front of
the Senate and Governmental Affairs Committee on May 9, 2009. See Senate
Hearing, supra note 4.
57. Sears, 421 U.S. at 150 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing S. REP.
No. 813, at 9 (1965)). In the executive privilege context, the U.S. Supreme
Court said that "human experience teaches that those who expect public
dissemination of their remarks may well temper candor with a concern for
appearances ... to the detriment of the decision-making process." United States
v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974). But see Wetlaufer, supra note 18, at 897-98
("[T]he deliberative [process] rationale rests on the conclusory and unverified
assertions of interested parties and has never been supported by anything that
might fairly be called evidence.").
58. Wetlaufer, supra note 18, at 886-87. An additional criticism is that if
the possibility of future disclosure did truly have a chilling effect, it would have
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requiring an interpretation of this phrase has given courts the
opportunity to further flesh out the deliberative process concept.59
For a record to qualify for Exemption 5's deliberative process
privilege, it must be both "pre-decisional" (i.e., generated prior to
the adoption of a policy or decision) and "deliberative" (i.e.,
actually related to the process of formulating a policy). 6 0
The first prong of the deliberative process privilege is that the
document must be pre-decisional. 6 1 A document generated after a
decision has been made-a so-called "post-decisional" record-is
not privileged.62 A pre-decisional document, though, does not lose
its protection after the decision is made. 63 However, the privilege is
waived if the agency incorporates the pre-decisional information
into its final decision, either expressly or by reference.64
Nevertheless, establishing that the pre-decisional document was
actually incorporated into a final decision can be a difficult hurdle
for a requester.65
The second prong of the deliberative process privilege-that
the document be "deliberative"-focuses on the content of the
communication rather than its time of generation. For a
communication to be deliberative, it must "make[]
recommendations or express[] opinions on legal or policy
matters." 66 Factual material is not ordinarily included within the
its greatest chilling effect against someone who was offering advice known to be
"bad" or against public interest. Society wants that type of advice to be chilled,
not protected. Id. at 888-89.
59. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (2006) (exempting from disclosure under FOIA
"inter-agency ... memorandums or letters which would not be available by law
to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency").
60. See Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 861 F.2d 1114, 1117 (9th
Cir. 1988).
61. Id.
62. Sears, 421 U.S. at 151-52; Coastal States Gas Corp. v. U.S. Dep't of
Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 869 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
63. May v. U.S. Dep't of the Air Force, 777 F.2d 1012, 1014-15 (5th Cir.
1985).
64. Sears, 421 U.S. at 161; Bristol-Meyers Co. v. FTC, 598 F.2d 18, 24
(D.C. Cir. 1978).
65. See Weaver & Jones, supra note 52, at 294-95. In Ashfar v. U.S.
Department of State, after a district court refused to force the government to
state whether the pre-decisional memoranda at issue had in fact been adopted,
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals remanded to "allow the government an
opportunity to show that [the pre-decisional materials] were not so adopted."
702 F.2d 1125, 1143 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
66. Vaughn v. Rosen, 523 F.2d 1136, 1144 (D.C. Cir. 1975); see also
Paisley v. CIA, 712 F.2d 686, 699-700 (D.C. Cir. 1983), vacated in part on
other grounds, 724 F.2d 201 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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privilege, 67 because the privilege is designed to protect the process
of deliberation itself. But if the disclosure of facts underlying the
decision would in some way injure the quality of the decision
making process or subject policy deliberations to "unwarranted
scrutiny," then those facts can be withheld.68 Factual material that
can be segregated from privileged material must be released unless
it is so "intertwined" with the deliberative process that separation
is not possible without revealing the policy-making process. 69
D. Procedural Requirements Under FOIA
The government bears the burden of showing a document is
privileged. 70 The government must specifically assert a privilege
over every record sought, usually in what is called a Vaughn
index.7 1 The court is not mandated to conduct an in camera review
of the requested records to determine whether they are exempt
from disclosure.72 The Vaughn court set up an indexing alternative
to in camera production, allowing those who seek disclosure a
chance to dispute the government's characterization of the
documents. 73 In a Vaughn index, the government must detail each
assertion of the privilege, including a description of the record
sought-the author, recipient, and subject matter74-as well as an
explanation of why that record is privileged. If an index is so
67. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 87-88 (1973) ("[Mlemoranda consisting
only of compiled factual material or purely factual material contained in
deliberative memoranda and severable from its context would generally be
available for discovery by private parties in litigation with the Government.").
68. Mapother v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 3 F.3d 1533, 1537-40 (D.C. Cir.
1993) ("[T]he selection of the facts thought to be relevant clearly involves 'the
formulation or exercise of . .. policy-oriented judgment' or 'the process by
which policy is formulated."' (quoting Petroleum Info. Corp. v. U.S. Dep't of
the Interior, 976 F.2d 1429, 1435 (D.C. Cir. 1992))).
69. Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1077-78 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
70. Bureau of Nat'l Affairs, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 742 F.2d 1484,
1497 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
71. The Vaughn index is named after the case in which a court first imposed
such a requirement. See generally Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
72. Mink, 410 U.S. at 93. An in camera review in this context would
involve a judge reviewing in private those records in question to determine
whether those records fall under an exemption to release. See 5 U.S.C. §
552(a)(4)(B) (2006).
73. Vaughn, 484 F.2d at 824 ("This lack of knowledge by the party seeking
disclosure seriously distorts the traditional adversar[ial] nature of our legal
system's form of dispute resolution.").
74. See Arthur Andersen & Co. v. IRS, 679 F.2d 254, 258 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
75. Mead Data Central, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of the Air Force, 566 F.2d 242,
250-51 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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vague that the district court cannot adequately rule, then the court
must enage in some other type of review, such as in camera
review. A Vaughn index may be preferred when the nature and
number of disputed documents would place a large burden on a
court undertaking in camera review.
Even though Louisiana courts have for years talked about the
importance of an index in determining whether a record must be
released, courts have stopped short of making such an index a
requirement. The deliberative process privilee, on the other
hand, is a newcomer to Louisiana jurisprudence. How Louisiana
courts decide to incorporate these federal concepts will greatly
impact the effect Section 44:5 has on the public's right to access
records. But just because the legislature inserted a definition of the
deliberative process privilege into Section 44:5 does not mean that
courts must now adopt an entire body of federal precedent.80
Instead, courts will necessarily have to mold these new concepts to
fit within the state's well-established public records doctrine.
III. LouIsIANA'S PUBLIC RECORDS LAW AND ITS SPECIAL
TREATMENT OF THE GOVERNOR
When Louisiana enacted its vublic records law in 1940, it was
only the eleventh state to do so. 1 For seven decades, Louisiana's
public records law gave the governor's office a near blanket
exemption. 82 Whether the governor was a reformer or a governor-
in-need-of-reform, the public had very little ability to get a glimpse
into what informed the decisions of the state's most powerful
decision-maker. That lack of transparency had even more
pronounced effects considering that some believe the Louisiana
76. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 25 F.3d 1241, 1250 (4th Cir. 1994).
77. Arthur Andersen & Co., 679 F.2d at 258.
78. See discussion infra Part IV.D.
79. See discussion infra Part IV.A.1.
80. See discussion infra Part IV.A.2.
81. Splichal, supra note 32, at 19.
82. See Act No. 195, § 5, 1940 La. Acts 832, 834-35 ("That the provisions of
this Act shall not apply to any of the books, records, writings, accounts, letters,
letter books, photographs or copies thereof ordinarily kept in the custody or
control of the Governor of the State of Louisiana in the usual course of the duties
and business of his office; provided that the provisions of this section shall not be
construed to prevent any person otherwise herein authorized so to do from
examining and copying any books, records, papers, accounts or other documents
pertaining to any money or moneys or any financial transactions in the control of
or handled by or through the Governor of the State of Louisiana."). The provision
requiring disclosure of financial transactions of the governor has survived through
today. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44:5(C) (Supp. 2010).
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governor to be one of the most powerful governors in the
country,83 demonstrated by a long history of governors who
exerted a great deal of control over the state, including powerful
governors like Huey Long and Edwin Edwards. 84
By 2009, this blanket exemption for the governor left
Louisiana an outlier from the rest of the country, where only two
other states similarly exempted the governor.8 5 Most states treat the
records of the governor's office under the same body of law
applicable to any other government record.86 To understand just
how far the governor's blanket exemption once spread, one should
look at the whole of public records law in Louisiana. Public
records are defined as
[a]ll . . . records . . . having been used, being in use, or
prepared, possessed, or retained for use in the conduct,
transaction or performance of any business, transaction,
work, duty, or function [of government] . . . except as
otherwise provided in this Chapter or the Constitution of
Louisiana.
The Louisiana Constitution provides that "[n]o person shall be
denied the right to . . . examine public documents, except in cases
established by law." Any exemption in the statute-and there are
83. Hearing on SB 278 Before the House and Gov. Affairs Comm., 2009
Reg. Sess. (La. June 16, 2009) [hereinafter House Hearing], available at
http://house.louisiana.gov/H Video/HseVideoOnDemand.htm (statement of
Carl Redman, executive editor of the Baton Rouge Advocate).
84. The Louisiana governor can adjust the budgets of all state agencies and
departments, even those headed by separate elected officials. See Jeremy Alford,
Members Only, INDEP. WKLY. (Lafayette, La.), Nov. 4, 2009, at 10. The
Louisiana governor holds a large sway in the election of the leadership of the
state legislature, including committee chairs. See Mark Ballard, Op-Ed., Jindal
Sticks with Tradition, ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, La.), Nov. 25, 2007, at 9B;
Michelle Millhollon, Jindal Favors Tucker for Post, ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge,
La.), Nov. 21, 2007, at 1A; Michelle Millhollon, Jindal's Choice: Democrat
Joel Chaisson II Tapped for Senate President, ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, La.),
Nov. 13, 2007, at IA. The governor has appointment power over not only
dozens of boards and commissions, but also over the department heads of
powerful state departments that do things like build highways and manage
health care. See Marsha Shuler, Jindal Sends Senate List of Appointees,
ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, La.), June 11, 2008, at 6A.
85. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 15.232(d)(i) (West 2004) (Michigan
Freedom of Information Act applies to the executive branch, but not the
Governor, Lieutenant Governor, or their executive offices); MIss. CODE ANN. §
25-61-3(a) (West Supp. 2009) (public bodies, for the purpose of public records
law, do not include elected officials).
86. See REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, supra note 45.
87. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44:1(A)(2) (2007) (emphasis added).
88. LA. CONST. art. XII, § 3.
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hundreds-must be construed narrowly, with any doubt resolved in
favor of the public's right of access. As such, under the version
of the law in place for decades, the blanket exemption kept the
governor safe above the normal public records fray. Because of
this, Louisiana courts have never handled a public records case
involving a governor.90 Hence, courts will be addressing this new
law with a near-clean jurisprudential slate.
In 2001, the legislature opened the door slightly, amending the
governor's exemption so that 70 agencies, boards, and
commissions placed under the authority of the governor no longer
enjoyed the same blanket exemption as the governor.9 1 But the
largest change to public records law-and the most controversial-92
came in the summer of 2009. The governor proposed, and the
legislature approved, a revision that essentially reworks the entire
concept of public records law as it applies to the governor.9 3 The
revision purports to place the governor on the same public records
playing field as the rest of government, but lets the governor play
by a different set of rules.
On the surface, the now-amended law would seem to treat the
governor's office the same as other public bodies, i.e., what the
governor's office produces is a public record, unless that record
falls within an exemption. However, few states have statutory
exemptions that apply only to the governor, and some of
Louisiana's new exemptions-one for records involving the
deliberative process of the governor and another for agency
records prepared in connection with the budget-could be applied
in such a way that ironically results in a less transparent
government than before the revision. 94
89. Times Picayune Publ'g Corp. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 845 So. 2d 599,
605 (La. Ct. App. 1st 2003). There are several lists of exemptions contained in
public records law and throughout the body of Louisiana law. Included in the
exemptions are birth and death certificates, taxpayer records, fishing licenses,
juvenile court records, and adoption records. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
44:4.1(B)(24)-(35) (Supp. 2010).
90. The handful of Louisiana court cases to even mention Section 44:5 do
so only when including the governor's exemption as one of many exemptions in
the state's public records law. See Bester v. La. Sup. Ct. Comm. on Bar
Admissions, 779 So. 2d 715, 719 (La. 2001).
91. Act No. 9, § 6, 2001 La. Acts 28, 36 ("[T]he provisions of this
Subsection shall not apply to any state agency placed within the governor's
office pursuant to R.S. 36:4.1.").
92. Editorial, Our Views: Veto Public Records Bill, ADVOCATE (Baton
Rouge, La.), June 26, 2009, at 8B.
93. Act No. 395, 2009 La. Acts 3026.
94. See discussion infra Part IV.B-C.
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Critics were quite vocal about the problems with Act 495. The
state's largest newspapers lobbied against the bill,95 saying future
governors could take advantage of the deliberative process
privilege by extending its reach far beyond the three floors of the
State Capitol occupied by the governor's office. 96 Newspapers also
worried that the new budgetary privilege would allow the
government to withhold budget preparation information to which
the public previously had access, resulting in a lack of meaningful
public debate over the state's $30 billion budget. 97 Archivists and
historians testified that the lack of clear archive requirements could
endanger the study of history. 98 Even eventual supporters of the
measure, the Louisiana Press Association, acknowledged that
"issues" still caused them pause,99 like the subjective nature of
deliberative process and the ability to withhold the governor's past
schedule.1oo But the governor's office insisted that Act 495, by
moving from a custody-based prohibition to a content-based test,
represented a transformational move toward transparency. 01 Can
these divergent views be reconciled?
IV. POSSIBLE INTERPRETATIONS AND AMENDMENTS TO ACT 495:
How To TURN MOONSHINE BACK INTO SUNSHINE
The truth is that no one can be certain exactly how Act 495 will
impact the public's ability to gather information from the state
95. The statewide organization of newspapers, the Louisiana Press
Association, negotiated with the governor's office and, in the end, supported the
legislation. House Hearing, supra note 83 (statement of David Woolridge,
Louisiana Press Association attorney). Carl Redman with the Baton Rouge
Advocate told the same committee that his newspaper, along with the New
Orleans Times-Picayune, were against the measure because, as the newspapers
with the most Capitol coverage, the bill would "create huge problems for us." Id
(statement by Carl Redman).
96. Under the old law, the public could not access records in the "fourth,
fifth and sixth floors" of the State Capitol-where the Office of the Governor
and its various components are located-but if the records were also located
outside of the Governor's Office, those records were subject to the Public
Records Act. Id. (statement by Carl Redman) ("Now, it's too broad. I'm worried
about [the deliberative process privilege] extending way beyond this big pointy
building.").
97. Id. (statement by Carl Redman).
98. Id. (statement by Tara Laver, archivist).
99. Id. (statement by David Woolridge). Woolridge made a baseball
analogy, saying the association was "playing small ball," looking for small
victories. Id.
100. Id. (statement by David Woolridge).
101. Id. (statement by Jimmy Faircloth, Jr., then-executive counsel for
Governor Bobby Jindal).
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government. That determination will have to play out over the
years as courts interpret the new statute. Given the controversial
nature of the passage of Act 495, it is also possible that the state
legislature will tinker with Section 44:5 in the future. What is
certain is that Act 495 will present the governor, the public, and the
courts with some critical questions to answer in the coming years.
A. The Deliberative Process Privilege in Louisiana
What is it that a governor does, really, besides make decisions?
As the head of the executive branch, a governor's role in
administering the law is necessarily top-down. Those under the
governor-his advisors, agencies, and departments-make
proposals and give him options; then the governor makes decisions
based on those proposals and options.o Unlike the legislative or
judicial branches, the executive branch is embodied in one person.
Therefore, that single person's decisions and actions have great
import and, in a democracy, deserve serious scrutiny. The
deliberative process privilege is designed to improve the function
of decision-making, to ensure that those who advise the governor
feel free to offer candid advice. 104 But as written, it is unclear how
far that deliberative process will reach in Louisiana. What types of
records will it cover? Will courts adopt a pure FOIA approach, or
will they, like other states, fashion their own interpretation?
One problem with the deliberative process privilege as found in
Section 44:5 is that the legislature took what is a common law
concept, developed from years of federal case law, and attempted
to define it in statute without the benefit of applicable Louisiana
precedent.s0 5 No other state has taken this cart-before-the-horse
approach. 106 Had Louisiana already developed a common law
deliberative process privilege, or if it had instead passed a statute
102. Those in the highest of executive positions have described this
differently. President Harry S. Truman had a sign on his desk that read "The
Buck Stops Here." President George W. Bush said, "I listen to all voices, but
mine is the final decision. ... I am the decider. And I decide what is best."
Jimmy Faircloth, Jr. said the governor's office is primarily about receiving
information and thinking about it. "The fourth floor is really for the governor [to
receive information] and think about what he's going to do. That's really what it
does. We try to give advice, make good decisions, weed out bad decisions, think
about the consequences. No real work goes out of the fourth floor in terms of
product." Id. (statement by Jimmy Faircloth, Jr.).
103. Id. (statement by Jimmy Faircloth, Jr.).
104. Jordan v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 591 F.2d 753, 772-73 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
105. See discussion infra Part IV.A.l.
106. See REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, supra note 45.
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that more closely mirrors the approach of FOIA's Exemption 5,107
then this new statute would not present such a challenge of
interpretation. Instead, Act 495's definition of deliberative process
was piecemealed from the one Louisiana case to ever discuss the
concept of a deliberative process privilege. 08
1. Kyle v. Louisiana Public Service Commission Is a Flawed
Source ofDeliberative Process Doctrine for Louisiana
The drafters of Act 495 apparently leaned heavily on Kyle v.
Louisiana Public Service Commission 09  to help define
"deliberative process" in the new statute because there was
nowhere else to look in Louisiana jurisprudence. Unfortunately,
Kyle proves unusable in establishing a solid base on which courts
can fashion future interpretations of deliberative process. In 2004,
State Legislative Auditor Dan Kyle, in the course of an audit,
requested all emails of the Louisiana Public Service
Commission. 110 When the commission's counsel notified the
auditor that it needed some time to redact privileged material, the
auditor responded with a writ of mandamus seeking immediate
release of all emails, asserting that the commission did not have the
discretion to decide which emails to send."' The bulk of the
Louisiana First Circuit's opinion deals with the propriety of the
issuance of a writ of mandamus in the legislative audit context and
the ability of the commission to assert attorney-client privilege
over some of the emails.112 Not until the last page of the ten-page
opinion does the court dip its toe into the sea of deliberative
process jurisprudence. " After acknowledging the lack of
controlling cases, the court turns to federal cases that it deems
"instructive" and that "contain an excellent discussion of the
deliberative process privilege."ll 4 The first circuit quotes a lengthy
107. For example, some states mirror the statutory language of Exemption 5.
See, e.g., TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 552.111 (West 2004) (exempting any
"interagency or intra-agency memorandum or letter that would not be available
by law to a party in litigation with the agency"); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 16-4-
203(b) (West 2007).
108. Kyle v. La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 878 So. 2d 650 (La. Ct. App. 1st 2004).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 651.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 659.
114. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981). Upjohn is a leading
case defining the scope of the attorney-client privilege in corporate settings.
Other than Upjohn's statement that the application of a privilege should be dealt
with on a "case-by-case" basis, the first circuit does not make clear what
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section of Taxation with Representation Fund v. IRS,"' in which
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit outlined the broad
parameters of a deliberative process definition and its purpose. The
Louisiana First Circuit swiftly concluded that "our review of the
cases leaves no doubt" that the commission can claim a
deliberative process privilege. 116 But there is doubt.
Unsatisfying for its lack of discussion, Kyle merely delineates
the starting point of a discussion of deliberative process in
Louisiana. Kyle, borrowing from NLRB v. Sears,117 includes within
the privilege those "confidential intra-agency advisory opinions
disclosure of which would be injurious to the consultative
functions of government."' 18 From Coastal States Gas Corp. v.
U.S. Department of Energy," Kyle borrows a definition of the
privilege extending to documents "reflecting advisory opinions,
recommendations, and deliberations comprising part of a process
by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated, as
well as other subjective documents that reflect the personal
opinions of the writer prior to the agency's adoption oa
policy."l2 0 The drafters of Act 495 obviously had Kyle in mind.
Act 495 defines deliberative process as "the process by which
decisions and policies are formulated," a definition lifted directly
from Kyle. 122 Records of this sort, according to Act 495, contain
"pre-decisional advice, opinions, deliberations, or
recommendations"-a summarization of the general definitions
cited in Kyle. Even though a clear connection can be drawn
between the language in Kyle and Act 495's definition of
implications Upjohn may have on Louisiana's view of the deliberative process
privilege. See also Taxation with Representation Fund v. IRS, 646 F.2d 666
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (citing Coastal States Gas Corp. v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 617
F.2d 854, 862 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
115. 646 F.2d at 677. The quoted portion itself is merely a combination of
language from NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132 (1975), and
Coastal States Gas, 617 F.2d 854.
116. Kyle, 878 So. 2d at 659.
117. 421 U.S. 132.
118. Kyle, 878 So. 2d at 659.
119. Coastal States Gas, 617 F.2d at 862.
120. Id. (emphasis added). The italicized portions are reflected in the
language of Louisiana Revised Statutes section 44:5.
121. Senate Hearing, supra note 4 (statement of Jimmy Faircloth, Jr.).
Faircloth cited Kyle for the proposition that the governor's office already had a
court-established deliberative process privilege and one recognized generally
within the state Constitution: "I would be very happy for the minutes of this
meeting to reflect that the purpose of [Act 495] is to put the statutory privilege
on the same plane with the constitutional privilege." Id.
122. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44:5(D)(1) (Supp. 2010).
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deliberative process, this is only one piece of the deliberative
process puzzle. The statute's similarities crack open the door just
enough for courts to be tempted to use federal FOIA jurisprudence
to interpret the provisions of Act 495. But the question remains
whether the door been opened wide enough to let in the whole
body of FOIA jurisprudence-dealing with additional federal
deliberative process concepts like waiver and segregation 23-or
just those cases that lend a hand to determine the general nature of
deliberative process.
Either way, Kyle is an imperfect vehicle to import an entire
body of deliberative process doctrine into Louisiana law. The Kyle
court never discussed the definition it pasted onto the end of its
decision. Instead the court described the passage-bits of which
later found their way into Section 44:5-as "instructive" and "an
excellent discussion," after conceding it had found nothing
"controlling" on the issue of deliberative process. 124 This is not an
instance, then, of a legislature codifying established case law.
Despite the governor's executive counsel assertions in legislative
testimony that the governor's office already has a constitutional
privilege, 125 no Louisiana court had established that privilege
before Kyle, and Kyle itself fell short of doing so.
123. When an agency does more than simply adopt the findings of a report,
but instead makes reference to that report or memoranda in its dealings with the
public, it is deemed to have waived the deliberative process privilege. Nat'l
Council of La Raza v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 411 F.3d 350, 358 (2d Cir. 2005);
Taxation with Representation Fund v. IRS, 646 F.2d 666, 678 (D.C. Cir. 1981);
see also Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Train, 491 F.2d 63, 70 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(noting that disclosure is required "where a decision-maker has referred to an
intra-agency memorandum as a basis for his decision," because "once adopted
as a rationale for a decision, the memorandum becomes part of the public
record" (emphasis added)). Additionally, courts will require factual material to
be segregated from deliberative process material and disclosed unless that
factual material would either itself reveal deliberations process or unless the
factual material is so "inexorably intertwined" with deliberative material that
segregation is not possible. Mead Data Central, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of the Air
Force, 566 F.2d 242, 260 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
124. Kyle v. La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 878 So. 2d 650, 659 (La. Ct. App. 1st
2004).
125. Senate Hearing, supra note 4 (statement of Jimmy Faircloth, Jr.); see
also Public Records in the Office of the Governor, supra note 4 ("Under the
Louisiana Constitution, each branch of government has a privilege that protects
its deliberative process."). Unlike the executive branch, however, the Louisiana
Supreme Court has clearly recognized a judicial branch privilege, based on
separation of powers doctrine. Bester v. La. Sup. Ct. Comm. on Bar Admissions,
779 So. 2d 715 (La. 2001). The Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal
recognized a legislative privilege against disclosure of records that would
interfere when legislators were acting "within the legislative sphere." Copsey v.
Baer, 593 So. 2d 685, 689 (La. Ct. App. 1st 1991).
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Moreover, if Kyle did establish a deliberative process privilege
for the executive branch of government, the court did not say from
where that privilege derived or to whom that privilege applies. The
relevant portion of the case contains no discussion of the state
Constitution or prior state jurisprudence. Instead, the court quoted
from cases defining the purpose of deliberative process under
federal law.126 Kyle extended the privilege to the Public Service
Commission, a separately elected state commission, in the context
of an audit by the Legislative Auditor.' 27 The Legislative Auditor
sought the emails under the power of its authorizing statute, not
public records law. 128 The first circuit had already found that the
Legislative Auditor exceeded the scope of that authority, so the
court had no need to discuss deliberative process.129 The most that
one may conclude is that in Kyle the first circuit endorsed, in dicta,
what it described as an "instructive" definition of deliberative
process, but it established nothing regarding the scope, proper
application, or invocation of that privilege.
Because it is doubtful what Kyle actually established, the
original question remains: what will be the scope of the Louisiana
governor's deliberative process privilege in Section 44:5? As Kyle
offers little guidance, the definition in the new statute itself has to
be the starting point. Put shortly, if a record has or will be used by
the governor to make a decision or formulate a policy, and if that
record amounts to pre-decisional advice, opinion, deliberation, or a
recommendation, then it is exempted from disclosure.' 30 The
definition points to a body of case law, both federal and state. The
Louisiana Legislature, though, gave no further hint as to its
preference of the many approaches found in that jurisprudence.
Clearly, Louisiana courts are free to operate from a blank slate.
Although FOIA approaches can be helpful, they are by no means
controlling.' 3 '
126. Kyle, 878 So. 2d at 659.
127. Id. at 652.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 655-56 (interpreting LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24:522(C) (2007), the
statute that empowers the Legislative Auditor).
130. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44:5 (Supp. 2010).
131. Capital City Press v. E. Baton Rouge Metro. Council, 696 So. 2d 562,
567-68 (La. 1997) (noting that although FOIA and 34 other states might
disallow the disclosure of public job applications, Louisiana public records law
contained no such exemption, so the other jurisprudence was not helpful).
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2. Once the Decision Is Made, the Pre-Decisional Protection
Should End
Louisiana courts are free to, and should, reject FOIA precedent
and approaches when to do so would contradict well-established
principles of Louisiana public records law. 132 Federal FOIA
jurisprudence instructs that if a document is pre-decisional,
generated to help in the "give-and-take" of policymaking, then it
may forever be withheld, barring some waiver by the custodian. 33
In the federal context, only a record reflecting a final decision or
one generated after the decision is made-a "post-decisional"
document-must be released. 134 But some states have expressly
rejected this approach, deciding instead to allow the deliberative
process privilege to shield material only up until that moment that
a decision is made.'35 Unlike FOIA, those states' laws say that
once a decision is made, then the pre-decisional, deliberative
material that helped inform that decision must be disclosed.136
A Connecticut statute allows the government to withhold
"preliminary drafts or notes" as long as the custodian determines
that the public interest in withholding those documents outweighs
the public interest in disclosure.' 3 In Wilson v. Freedom of
Information Commission, the Connecticut Supreme Court held this
exemption applied to "advisory opinions, recommendations, and
deliberations comprising part of the 3process by which
governmental decisions are formulated." A year after the
decision, the Connecticut General Assembly effectively overruled
Wilson, amending the statute to require the disclosure of intra-
agency memoranda, letters, advisory opinions, and
recommendations that comprise "part of the process by which
governmental decisions are formulated," unless that record is
"subject to revision prior to submission to or discussion among the
members of such agency." 39 In effect, the Connecticut General
Assembly broke with federal pre-decisional precedent. That a
record was prepared before the decision was made is not, on its
132. See id.
133. May v. U.S. Dep't of the Air Force, 777 F.2d 1012, 1014-15 (5th Cir.
1985).
134. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 161 (1975); Coastal
States Gas Corp. v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 869 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
135. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-210(e)(1) (West, Westlaw
through July 2010 Spec. Sess.).
136. See, e.g., id.
137. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-210(b)(1).
138. 435 A.2d 353, 359 (Conn. 1980).
139. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-210(e)(1).
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own, enough to qualify that record for an exemption. Instead, the
pre-decisional record is exemot only if it had been subject to
revision prior to that decision.
Florida public records law produces a similar outcome.' 4'
Although rough drafts, notes, or dictations would not be public
records, intra-agency communications between employees, "even
though not a part of an agency's later, formal public product," are
still public records when they "supply the final evidence of
knowledge obtained in connection with the transaction of official
business."l 42
The language of Section 44:5 does not prohibit an
interpretation of deliberative process similar to that in Connecticut
and Florida and should, therefore, be adopted in Louisiana. This
approach is both consistent with Kyle and the general spirit of
public records doctrine in this state. Although Kyle adopted a
general definition and purpose of "deliberative process" from
federal FOIA cases it stopped short of adopting FOIA's definition
of "pre-decisional."'43 Louisiana courts are required to interpret the
exemptions in public records law strictly, erring on the side of
disclosure.144 Section 44:5 leaves open the pre-decisional question
and, because courts must adopt an interpretation that leads to more
disclosure, rather than less,' that question must be answered by
adopting a pre-decisional definition similar to Connecticut and
Florida. Barring further legislative guidance then, Louisiana courts
140. Id
141. See Shelvin v. Byron, Harless, Schaffer, Reid & Assocs., 379 So. 2d
633 (Fla. 1980).
142. Id. Massachusetts has also declined to adopt the federal principle that
pre-decisional documents are protected even after the decision has been made.
See MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 4, § 7 (West, Westlaw through ch. 380 of 2010
2d Ann. Sess.) (exempting intra-agency memoranda or letters relating to policy
positions being developed by the agency, but not if those documents are
"reasonably completed factual studies or reports on which the development of
such policy positions has been or may be based").
143. Kyle v. La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 878 So. 2d 650, 659 (La. Ct. App. 1st
2004).
144. Title Research Corp. v. Rausch, 450 So. 2d 933, 936 (La. 1984) ("The
right of the public to have access to the public records is a fundamental right,
and is guaranteed by the constitution. The provision of the constitution must be
construed liberally in favor of free and unrestricted access to the records, and
that access can be denied only when a law, specifically and unequivocally,
provides otherwise. Whenever there is doubt as to whether the public has the
right of access to certain records, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the
public's right to see. To allow otherwise would be an improper and arbitrary
restriction on the public's constitutional rights." (emphasis added) (citing LA.
CONST. art. XII, § 3)).
145. Id
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should allow a governor to claim the deliberative process privilege
only while a decision is pending.
3. Only the Governor May Claim the Privilege-and Only Over
Documents That Were at One Time in His Custody
The last issue under this deliberative process privilege analysis
is whether anyone other than the governor can claim the privilege.
Related to this issue is whether the governor can use his privilege
against disclosure to block the disclosure of materials he has yet to
use in his deliberative process. In other words, who can wield the
privilege and over which documents?
An illustration is in order. Suppose that a state agency has
prepared a report as part of its usual duties. In response to a public
records request seeking the report, the agency claims that the
report is being retained for use by the governor and is therefore
exempt from disclosure. The statute makes clear that the record
must be disclosed. 146 Only the governor may claim the deliberative
process privilege, and he may only claim that privilege over
records that have at one time been in his custody. Section 44:5
makes clear that "agenc[ies], office[s], or department[s] transferred
or placed within the office of the governor" cannot claim the
deliberative process privilege. 14 8 Many executive agencies, offices,
and departments of government, however, are not placed under the
office of the governor.149 Whether the record in question originated
in an agency within the governor's office or an executive agency
outside the governor's office, only the governor may claim the
privilege. If the legislature denied agencies inside the governor's
office the ability to claim a deliberative process privilege, then it
146. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44:5(A) (Supp. 2010).
147. This reading is informed by the phrase "records having been used ... by
the governor." Id.
148. The only provision of Section 44:5 that does apply to agencies
underneath the governor confers a six-month privilege on records "limited to
pre-decisional advice and recommendations to the governor concerning
budgeting in the custody of any agency or department headed by an unclassified
gubernatorial appointee." Id. § 44:5(B)(2). These agencies include the Division
of Administration, the Governor's Office of Homeland Security and Emergency
Preparedness, the Office of Rural Development, and the Coastal Protection and
Restoration Authority. See id. § § 36:4-:4. 1.
149. Executive agencies not under the office of the governor include the
Department of Insurance, the Department of State, the Department of Justice,
the Department of Agriculture, the Department of the Treasury, the Department
of Transportation and Development, the Department of Health and Hospitals,
and the Department of Economic Development. Id. § 36:4(A).
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could not have intended that agencies outside the governor's office
would be able to claim the same privilege.
Assume now that it is the governor who claims a privilege over
the hypothetical agency report. The governor may claim that,
because Section 44:5(A) exempts records "having been used, being
in use, possessed, or retained for use by the governor . . . relating
to the deliberative process of the governor," the report-though not
yet sent to him-was being "retained for use by the governor." It is
instructive, though, that the previous version of the Section 44:5
protected records "having been used, being in use, or prepared
possessed, or retained for use by or on behalf of the governor."9156
Act 495, when originally introduced as Senate Bill 278, retained
this language.' The final bill as passed by the legislature,
however did not contain the "prepared" or "or on behalf of'
phrases. 2 The legislature clearly intended to limit what type of
records could be subject to the deliberative process. In other words,
the intent was not to allow documents to be withheld merely
because they are prepared for the governor or because those
records are retained on his behalf These deletions mean then that
no one outside the governor's office can prepare a record, then
later claim that record was actually prepared for or on behalf of the
governor. The governor must have used, be currently using, or
have possession of a record to claim the deliberative process
privilege. 153
It would be inconsistent with the purpose of the deliberative
process privilege to allow a governor to assert the privilege over
agency documents with which he has yet to come into contact. The
privilege is designed to protect pre-decisional advice and
recommendations that have played a part in the deliberations of the
governor's office. To allow a governor to claim that a record was
being "retained by" an agency for the governor's future use is
effectively a license for the governor to claim a privilege over
every requested agency document on the theory that the record
could conceivably, one day, play a part in the governor's decision-
making process. This "I was just about to use that" privilege is
clearly not what the legislature intended.
Instead, when the legislature amended Section 44:5 to remove
the "or on behalf of the governor" language, that evinced a clear
legislative intent that "retained for use by" the governor meant the
150. Id. § 44:5(A) (Supp. 2009) (amended 2009) (emphasis added).
151. S.B. 278, 2009 Leg., Reg. Sess. (as introduced, Apr. 27, 2009).
152. Act. No. 495, 2009 La. Acts 3026.
153. Budget records falling within the six-month privilege are, of course, the
exception to this analysis.
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governor's office must physically possess the documents. Further,
because the purpose of the deliberative process privilege is to
protect the thought processes and deliberations of the governor and
his staff, a governor claiming the privilege must have some level of
control over the documents. A governor cannot have utilized
records as part of his deliberative process if he has never laid eyes
on them. Therefore, to allow an agency to use the deliberative
process privilege to withhold information that it has not turned
over to the governor would be counter to both the purpose of the
deliberative process privilege and the legislative intent behind
Section 44:5.
There are other limitations. If a record has bearing on an
agency decision, but someone other than the governor made that
decision, then neither the governor nor the agency should be
allowed to claim the privilege. Also, the statute characterizes those
documents subject to the deliberative process privilege as only
those relating to the "usual course of the duties and business" of
the governor's office. 154 This provision would therefore not extend
the privilege to the governor's records that relate to something
outside his job as chief executive. 155
B. The New Budgetary Privilege: Shutting the Old "Back Door"
The deliberative process privilege is not the only privilege
discussed in Section 44:5. This section also contains a privilege
against disclosure of budget documents, a privilege "limited to pre-
decisional advice and recommendations to the governor."' 56 This
budgetary privilege expires six months after the document was
"prepared.' 5 7 A search of the other 49 states' public records laws
turns up no other statute with a similar provision, though a few
states, by statute, protect very specific categories of budgetary
information. 5 8 Critics of Act 495 expressed concern that a large
154. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44:5(A) (Supp. 2010).
155. See generally Herald Ass'n v. Dean, 816 A.2d 469 (Vt. 2002).
156. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44:5(B)(2).
157. Id.
158. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-2-305(29) (West, Westlaw through
2010 General Sess.) (exempting from disclosure a governor's budget
recommendations, proposals, and "policy statements, that if disclosed would
reveal the governor's contemplated policies or contemplated courses of action
before the governor has implemented or rejected those policies or courses of
action or made them public"). But see OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 24A.9 (2008)
("Prior to taking action, including making a recommendation or issuing a report,
a public official may keep confidential his or her personal notes and personally
created materials other than departmental budget requests of a public body
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body of records related to the state's annual budget process could
be shielded from disclosure.' 59 Budget documents once required to
be disclosed through the old law's "back door," i.e., records that
deal with budget concerns and are not in the governor's custody,
can now be withheld under the new law. The practical effect of this
new budgetary privilege is that records might now be withheld
until past the time in which they serve a useful purpose in public
debate, but state agencies and departments will still have to release
factual information used in the formulation of budget advice or
recommendations to the governor.
Importantly, Section 44:5 applies this privilege to documents in
the custody of an agency or department "headed by an unclassified
gubernatorial appointee."1 60 If the record is in the custody of
departments or agencies headed by a statewide elected official, like
the lieutenant governor, secretary of state, or insurance
commissioner, that record could not be withheld under the
budgetary privilege. But records housed in agencies such as the
Division of Administration, Department of Health and Hospitals,
and the Department of Transportation and Development could
enjoy the privilege.16'
The statute seems to suggest a line between agencies that can
invoke the budgetary privilege and those that cannot; however,
because of the way the budget is put together each year, the line is
actually not that clear. This is because the Division of
Administration, which can claim the privilege, eventually has
"custody" over every state department and agency's budget
proposal information before formulating them into an overall
proposed budget for the governor to present to the legislature.162
prepared as an aid to memory or research leading to the adoption of a public
policy or the implementation of a public project." (emphasis added)).
159. PAR Says Public Records Bill Would Stifle Open Government, supra
note 7.
160. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44:5(B)(2) (Supp. 2010).
161. Id.
162. Agencies and departments must submit their budget requests to the
governor's office no later than November 15, "on the forms and in the manner
prescribed and accompanied by such other data as may be required, together
with such additional information as the governor may request." Id § 39:33(A);
see also Performance-Based Budgeting Timeline, OFF. PLAN. & BUDGET,
http://doa.louisiana.gov/OPB/pbb/PBB%20Annual%20Timeline.pdf (last visited
Dec. 16, 2010). The Division of Administration requires agencies to send by
November 1 capital outlay budget requests to the Office of Facility Planning and
Control (part of the Division of Administration), as well as operating budget
requests to the Office of Planning and Budget (also part of the Division of
Administration), the Legislative Fiscal Office, the House Fiscal Division, Senate
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So in effect, the budgetary privilege could be interpreted to extend
to all budget-related pre-decisional advice and recommendations to
the governor, regardless of which department or agency generated
that record-as all such records would simultaneously be in the
custody of a protected agency, the Division of Administration.163
Every November, an ajency sends its budget request to the
Division of Administration. ' If the request contains "advice" or
"recommendations," it is subject to a six-month privilege that
protects that document from disclosure until around the beginning
of May. That record, then, is potentially open to disclosure for only
one month before the budget is finally adopted; open to disclosure
only after months of hearings have already been held; and open to
disclosure, frankly, only after the revelation of its contents comes
too late to make much of an impact on public discussion.
Aside from the timing element, the budgetary privilege
provision in the statute also raises the issue of what types of
records can qualify for the privilege. The legislature saw fit to
include in Section 44:5 the curious phrase "a record limited to pre-
decisional advice and recommendations to the governor
Fiscal Services, and the Office of the Legislative Auditor. LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 39:33(A).
163. The Division of Administration begins in November to collect those
various agency budget requests-along with supporting documents that might
be characterized as containing "advice" or "recommendations." See LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 39:30(A) (2005) ("The governor shall have in continuous process
of preparation and revision a tentative budget for the next year in the light of
direct studies of the operation, plans, and needs of budget units and of the yields
of existing and prospective sources of revenue. Upon receipt of the budget
requests from the budget units the governor shall cause to be made such further
inquiries and investigations, and such revisions of his tentative budget, as he
may warrant."); id. § 39:32 (dictating that budget requests may include
estimated costs of professional contracts, the number of expected employees and
their salaries, as well as a "current statement of the agency's mission and its
goals, objectives, performance indicators, and activities, as well as a detailed
plan of its operations"); Performance-Based Budgeting Timeline, supra note
162. The governor must present his proposed budget to the legislature no later
than 45 days before the beginning of each regular session. LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 39:37(A), :51(A) (2005 & Supp. 2010). The governor's capital outlay
proposal must be submitted to the legislature by March 1 of each year. Id. §
24:662(B) (2007). The beginning of regular sessions alternates between late-
March and late-April each year. LA. CONST. art III, § 2(A)(3)(a). On October 2,
2010, Louisiana voters approved a constitutional amendment to move the
beginning of regular sessions from the end of the month to the beginning of the
month. Act No. 537, 2009 La. Acts 3559. The governor introduces his proposed
budget in final form in either mid-February or mid-March each year. Regular
sessions end in mid-to-late June each year. LA. CONST. art III, § 2(A)(3)(a).
164. Performance-Based Budgeting Timeline, supra note 162.
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concerning budgeting."'6 5 Notably, the legislature did not exempt
records that include or amount to pre-decisional advice. A more
literal reading of the statute suggests that for the governor to be
able to claim a privilege on a record, the record itself must contain
nothing but pre-decisional advice or recommendations concerning
the budget. This would lead to odd results, however, as budgets are
primarily factual in nature-line item A should be funded by X
dollars next year. A budget recommendation that contained no
factual information would be practically useless.
The reading that makes the most sense is that the legislature
appears to have included its own severability provision; a record
concerning budget matters must be disclosed except for those
portions that contain pre-decisional advice or recommendations to
the governor. A requester would be allowed to see that line item A
was proposed for X dollars-the factual information-but would
not be allowed to see why the agency came to that
recommendation. Agencies and departments must disclose budget-
related documents, then, but only after excising any advice or
recommendations directed to the governor-thus "limiting" the
privilege to pre-decisional material. When an agency uses factual
information to compile a budget proposal, it cannot withhold that
factual information. The budget numbers themselves are factual in
nature and must be disclosed. Only advice or recommendations can
be withheld-and for only six months from the date the document
is prepared. In addition, the agency cannot withhold the document
on the claim that the release of purely factual information sheds
light on the deliberative process. Had the legislature intended this
result, it would have had no reason to enact the six-month privilege
provision in the first place-the deliberative process exemption on
its own would have sufficed.
To be clear, the new budgetary privilege will not completely
shut down debate over annual state budgets. The budget
proposal-the line item recommendations containing the bare
facts-will remain open and subject to months of hearings and
debates. But critics are right in that, even if in a moderate way, this
new privilege will close records that have been open to disclosure
for generations. Reporters have routinely mined these budget
requests and accompanyin recommendations for stories that shed
light on the state's budget. 6 Those recommendations may now be
privileged from disclosure. And it seems incongruous and counter
to sound public policy that the state's budget-a $30 billion
165. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44:5(B)(2) (Supp. 2010) (emphasis added).
166. House Hearing, supra note 83 (statement by Carl Redman, executive
editor of the Baton Rouge Advocate).
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document with wide-ranging affects-will be subject to lower
scrutiny than the average city or parish government budget. 6 7
Even if the six-month time limit and severability element mitigate
its effects, the new budgetary privilege will result in a less
transparent state government than before.
C. The Intra-Office Exemption-the Old Blanket Exemption in
Disguise
Unlike the two privileges already discussed, the intra-office
exemption included in Section 44:5 generated little discussion in
committee hearings. It may seem like an innocuous addition to the
statute. Although protecting the intra-office communications of the
governor is not as new or novel sounding as the other statutory
additions, it is still an important provision and one the legislature
should consider revisiting, because as applied it effectively revives
the supposedly extinct custody-based exemption for the governor.
The intra-office communications exemption is simple enough.
Records constituting intra-office communications are protected
from disclosure.'6 The exemption is limited to those
communications between and among the governor and the
governor's chief of staff, executive counsel, director of policy, and
those persons' staffs.' 6 9 However, those agencies placed within the
office of the governor are explicitly excluded from being able to
assert the intra-office exception. Therefore, communications sent
by those agencies to the gvernor's office do not qualify as "intra-
office" communications.
The intra-office communication exemption does not differ
much from the old custody-based blanket exemption. Under the
old law, if a record stayed at all times inside the governor's office
then it was exempt from disclosure."'7 Once it strayed-in other
words, if that document was ever in the custody of someone
outside the governor's office-it was subject to disclosure under
the public records law.172 Now, to the same effect, if a record both
originates inside the governor's office and is destined for someone
also inside the governor's office, it is by definition an "intra-office
167. Bartels v. Roussel, 303 So. 2d 833 (La. Ct. App. 1st 1974) (holding that
the mayor-president of East Baton Rouge Parish could not withhold
departmental budget requests, even though the mayor had yet to provide the
city-parish council with his final proposed budget).
168. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44:5(A).
169. Id. § 44:5(D)(2).
170. Id.
171. Id. § 44:5 (Supp. 2009) (amended 2009).
172. Id.
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communication."1 73 Broadly speaking, then, the new "intra-office
communication" exemption is quite similar to the old custody-
based blanket exemption.174
Admittedly, the intra-office communications protection does
not have exactly the same effect as the old blanket exemption-
when a private citizen communicates with the governor's office,
for example, that communication is not intra-office. Under the old
law, the very fact that a document was in the Aovernor's custody
placed that document off-limits to a requester.' But other aspects
of Act 495 might now allow the governor to withhold the
communication-for example, if it contained deliberative process
material.176 If a special interest group sent the governor a study that
the governor consulted to formulate a new policy, then the
governor could have a claim of deliberative process privilege from
releasing that document to the public.177 On the other hand, if a
lobbyist suggested a friend to serve on a board or commission, that
suggestion could either be considered advice ("it would be a good
idea to name Mr. So-and-so"), or merely factual information ("Mr.
So-and-so is a candidate for this position"). This latter category of
communication-merely factual information communicated by
someone outside of the governor's office-would constitute the
only type of record that will be newly available compared to what
would have been available under the old custody-based exemption.
The intra-office communication exemption, then, is in effect a
custody-based exemption dressed up in content-based clothing.
Getting rid of the old custody-based exemption was supposed to
have been the major thrust behind the new law.
If the legislature indeed intended to open up more records to
view, it could narrow the intra-office exemption to a true content-
based exemption in the way other states do or eliminate the intra-
office communication exception altogether. Texas, for example,
exempts intra-office communications only when a privilege against
their release could be asserted in a Judicial proceeding-adopting
the FOIA Exemption 5 approach. " Michigan makes it clear that
173. Id § 44:5(D)(2) (Supp. 2010).
174. Id. § 44:5(B) ("The provisions of this Section shall not apply to any
agency transferred or placed within the office of the governor.").
175. Id. § 44:5 (Supp. 2009) (amended 2009).
176. Id. § 44:5(A) (Supp. 2010).
177. Id. § 44:5(D)(3) ("Records 'relating to the deliberative process of the
governor' means all forms of pre-decisional advice, opinions, deliberations, or
recommendations made for the purpose of assisting the governor in the usual
course of the duties and business of his office.").
178. See, for example, TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 552.111 (West 2004),
which exempts "interagency or intraagency memoranda or letters that would not
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intra-office communications are only protected when they would
improperly disclose the agency's deliberative process, not when
they contain factual material or serve as evidence of a final
decision.' 7 9 An amendment along similar lines in Louisiana would
strike a better balance between the efficient functioning of an
office and the public's right to know.
The best solution, however, would be to eliminate the intra-
office communication protection altogether. The deliberative
process exemption would still serve to protect candor inside the
governor's office and, presumably, improve the quality of
decisions in that office. The attorney-client privilege and work
product privilege that exist elsewhere in the law already protect
communications between the governor and his executive
counsel. 80 Eliminating the intra-office communications protection
has the advantage of simplifying Section 44:5 to avoid the
potential overlap between intra-office communication assertions
and claims of deliberative process privilege-like the Mr. So-and-
so example above. Without a change, however, the intra-office
communications exemption will effectively operate as the old
custody-based blanket exemption. When combined with the other
new statutory exemptions, some of which reach records in the
custody of those outside the governor's office, the public will be
entitled to view fewer documents than under the old law. This is
just what critics feared.' 8 ' To make matters worse, someone
requesting a record from the governor must not only battle new
exemptions like the intra-office communication exemption, they
must do so without a formalized indexing requirement that in other
jurisdictions serves to give requesters a meaningful opportunity to
make their case that a record must be disclosed.
be available by law to a party in litigation with the agency." This is similar to
FOIA's exemption 5. Wyoming has an almost identical provision. WYo. STAT.
ANN. § 16-4-203(b)(v) (West 2007).
179. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 15.243(1)(m) (West Supp. 2010)
(exempting "communications and notes within a public body or between public
bodies of an advisory nature to the extent that they cover other than purely
factual materials and are preliminary to a final agency determination of policy or
action").
180. See LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 506 (2006) (attorney-client privilege);
LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1424 (Supp. 2010) (work product doctrine).
181. Records Bill Would Thwart Transparency, PAR Says, PUB. AFF. REs.
COUNCIL OF LA. (May 5, 2009), http://www.la-par.org/article.cfm?id=262&
cateid=2 ("Vague language ... combined with other nuances of SB 278, could
result in more records being off-limits to the public than current law allows.").
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D. Louisiana Courts Should Require a Vaughn-Like Index
In Louisiana, the custodian bears the burden of proving the
requested material is not a public record.182 If a custodian believes
a record is exempt, he is required to notify the requester, in
writing, of the reasons behind that belief, referencing his "basis
under the law."18 3 The parties have a right to a contradictory
hearing,184 at which each has a "meaningful opportunity" to debate
the claim of privilege.' 8 5 The public body must describe the nature
of the documents and the asserted exemption, and it must do so for
each document, not for the records as a whole. 186 Though Revised
Statutes section 44:35 allows the court to conduct an in camera
review of the material in question,' 8 7 there is no Vaughn index
equivalent required in Louisiana law. Still, Louisiana courts have
generally endorsed the idea of a detailed index as a method for trial
courts to handle the work of sorting through disputed documents-
most recently in In re A Matter Under Investigation.1 8 8
The Louisiana Supreme Court in In re A Matter Under
Investigation addressed whether the attorney general had to release
its investigative file of a case involving a health care worker whom
a grand jury refused to indict in connection with Hurricane
Katrina-related deaths.'8 9  Public records law exempts from
disclosure criminal investigative documents when further criminal
182. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44:35 (2007); Landis v. Moreau, 779 So. 2d
691, 696 (La. 2001); Elliot v. Taylor, 614 So. 2d 126, 128 (La. Ct. App. 4th
1993).
183. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44:32(D) (requiring that the written response
must be sent within three days of the request).
184. See id. § 44:35(B) (requiring that in a suit filed to disclose records,
"[t]he court shall determine the matter de novo and the burden is on the
custodian to sustain his action. The court may view the documents in
controversy in camera before reaching a decision.").
185. Cormier v. In re Pub. Records Request of DiGiulio, 553 So. 2d 806, 807
(La. 1989); Connella v. Johnson, 345 So. 2d 498, 501 (La. 1977); Skamangas v.
Stockton, 867 So. 2d 1009, 1017 (La. Ct. App. 2d 2004) (noting that the law
requires more than a judicial acceptance of a general assertion of a privilege);
Elliot, 614 So. 2d at 129 ("The public record doctrine requires more than a
judicial acceptance of an assertion of privilege by the prosecution; there must be
an opportunity for cross-examination and presentation of evidence to contradict
the claim of privilege.").
186. Skamangas, 867 So. 2d at 1017.
187. In camera review allows the judge, at his discretion, to view the
documents in private and in confidence before deciding whether the documents
in question were improperly withheld. Id. at 1016-17.
188. 15 So. 3d 972 (La. 2009).
189. Id. at 976.
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litigation is "reasonably anticipated."l 90 This case is instructive
because "reasonably anticipated" is similar to "deliberative
process"-both are subjective exemptions in a sea of otherwise
specific, objective exemptions found in other areas of public
records law. " The court remanded the case for a determination of
whether further prosecution of the health care worker was indeed
reasonably anticipated.
In a separate concurrence, Justice Knoll suggested that the trial
court, when reviewing the records in question, should: (1) require
from the attorney general a detailed, certified index of the records
in question, including a general description of the substance of
each record; (2) conduct an in camera review of the records to
ensure the descriptions in the index were adequate; (3) make any
needed redactions of the index; and (4) give the parties time to
address each specific record in the index. The judge could then
release the documents un-redacted, release the documents with his
own redactions, or allow the documents to be withheld.193
Justice Knoll's factors delineate the most efficient procedure
for courts tasked with determining whether a governor has made a
proper claim of privilege. Records that may contain pre-decisional
and deliberative material are often numerous, lengthy, and
technical in nature and may contain a mixture of factual material
and opinion.194 A detailed index would save courts from being
swamped by incomprehensible piles of paper by giving the court a
navigational guide. Both the parties and the court have a
compelling need for a detailed index as determinations must be
made on a case-by-case basis.195 The index increases judicial
190. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44:3(A)(1) (2007).
191. See id. § 44:4.1(B)(24)35) (West, Westlaw through 2010 Reg. Sess.),
which includes birth and death certificates, taxpayer records, fishing licenses,
juvenile court records, and adoption records. This is just one example of several
lists of specific, objective exemptions contained in public records law and
throughout the body of Louisiana law.
192. Justice Knoll, who dissented on other grounds, found that the index in
question was improper, in part, because it lacked systematic pagination, did not
identify the sender of individual documents, and left "no way to tell what was in
the correspondence file, and whether that file contained subpoenas, memoranda
or other like material." In re A Matter Under Investigation, 15 So. 3d at 1001-
02 n.3 (Knoll, J., dissenting). Justice Knoll developed these factors from a
similar list in Skamangas, 867 So. 2d at 1017.
193. In re A Matter Under Investigation, 15 So. 3d at 1001-02.
194. Arthur Andersen & Co. v. IRS, 679 F.2d 254, 258 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
("The concern in Vaughn was that unassisted court examination might be
prohibitively burdensome.").
195. Kyle v. La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 878 So. 2d 650, 658-59 (La. Ct. App.
1st 2004) (noting that Upjohn established that "applications of privilege
should be determined on a case-by-case basis").
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efficiency, allowing the court to cut short what could otherwise be
a burdensome in camera review.' 96 Because a contested record
request involving the governor is likely to be politically charged
and expensive to litigate, requiring an index would go a long way
to make sure the requester has a meaningful opportunity to cross-
examine at a contradictory hearing.197
Aside from the likely bulk and technical nature of documents
sought, a detailed index requirement would also help courts
navigate the often subjective nature of the new privileges in
Section 44:5. Louisiana public records law presumes all records of
government are open to inspection unless the government can
prove that they clearly fall within a statutory exemption.198
Figuring out whether a record fits within that exemption, though,
has proven an opaque determination, even in federal courts
operatinf with a full body of jurisprudence.199 Unlike other
states,20 Louisiana has no independent reviewing commission to
sort through requests. This was never a problem before because,
unlike some states, Louisiana's public records law was populated
mainly by objective exemptions. 20 1 With the addition of this
subjective exemption, however, custodians should not be allowed
to withhold a document without that document being subject to
necessary scrutiny. Justice Knoll's concurrence in In re A Matter
Under Investigation provides a good outline of what sort of
information custodians should include in such an index.202
Although a Vaughn-like index might not be necessary in all public
196. In re A Matter Under Investigation, 15 So. 3d at 1001-02.
197. Id.
198. Bartels v. Roussel, 303 So. 2d 833, 838 (La. Ct. App. 1st 1974)
("[S]tatutes providing for examination of public records must be liberally
interpreted so as to extend rather than restrict access to public records. Lastly,
and more importantly, we believe that the wording of our statute indicates
legislative intent to make all public records open to the public.").
199. 26A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5680, at 139-40 (1992) ("[T]he deliberative
process privilege perpetuates the difficult distinction between 'fact' and
'conclusion' or 'opinion' that has generated so much futile litigation in code
pleading and the rules governing testimony of witnesses.").
200. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-205 (West 2007) (providing for
the Freedom of Information Commission, a five-member body empowered to
enforce Connecticut's public records law and having the power to demand the
production of the records at issue); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 66, § 10(b)
(West, Westlaw through ch. 380 of 2010 2d Ann. Sess.) (Massachusetts's
Supervisor of Public Records); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:1A-7 (West 2004) (New
Jersey's Government Records Council).
201. See generally REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, supra
note 45.
202. In re A Matter Under Investigation, 15 So. 3d at 1001-02.
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records cases, the new subjective determinations in Act 495, along
with the need to lessen the burden on the parties and the court,
require that a governor provide a detailed index when deciding to
exert his privilege to contest a request.
E. The Legislature Should Open Up the Governor's Past Schedule
to Scrutiny
Although the privileges in Section 44:5 give some level of
protection to documents used by the governor to make decisions,
the statue's exemption for the governor's schedule removes from
public view entirely those persons who contribute to the
governor's decisions. Allowing a governor, even a popular
governor, to meet in secret with whomever he wishes-with no
worry about having to be accountable for that meeting-is bad
public policy, counter to the spirit of the rest of Louisiana public
records law. As such, the legislature should amend the statute to
permit the governor to withhold only his future schedule.
Louisiana is the only state in the country that specifically, by
statute, allows the governor to refuse to disclose his schedule.2
The legislative history of Act 495 makes obvious the legislature's
intent to allow the governor to withhold both his future and past
schedule. 204 The governor's future schedule is presumably already
exempt from disclosure by virtue of an existing provision of
Louisiana public records law that permits the withholding of
information that bears on security plans.20 5 In the handful of states
where courts have addressed the issue of the governor's past
schedule, the results hinge around the court's interpretation of
deliberative process. 206 In Vermont, a newspaper sought then-
Governor Howard Dean's past daily calendar in order to compare
the time Dean spent camaigning for President with the time spent
on gubernatorial duties. Dean attempted to invoke a broad
203. See generally REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, supra
note 45.
204. Senate Amendment No. 1597 of the 2009 Regular Session would have
made the governor's schedule a public record seven days after the scheduled
event took place. That amendment failed 6-33 in the State Senate on May 20,
2009.
205. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44:3(A)(3) (2007) (exempting the disclosure of
"[r]ecords containing security procedure").
206. Compare Herald Ass'n v. Dean, 816 A.2d 469 (Vt. 1995), with Times
Mirror Co. v. Super. Ct., 813 P.2d 240 (Cal. 1991) (holding that the governor's
past appointment books, calendars, and schedules are exempt under the
deliberative process provision of the California public records statute), and
Courier-Journal v. Jones, 895 S.W.2d 6, 10 (Ky. Ct. App. 1995).
207. Herald, 816 A.2d at 471.
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executive privilege, but the Vermont Supreme Court disagreed,
saying portions of the calendar showing activities related to Dean's
presidential campaign were not related enough to gubernatorial
policy-making or deliberations to qualify for a privilege. 20 8
Louisiana governors, however, will not have to prove that
some portions of their schedule qualify for deliberative process
protection. The statute is clear-the Louisiana governor's schedule
is none of the public's business.209 Although other states have
withheld a governor's schedule based on that schedule's supposed
propensity to shed too much light on the governor's internal
deliberative process,210 this reasoning is flawed. The purpose of the
deliberative process privilege is about protecting the substance of
pre-decisional discussions, i.e., what was said; it is not about
protecting the identity of those persons involved in pre-decisional
discussions, i.e., who participated in the discussion. 2 11 Indeed, a
208. Id. at 476 (remanded for a determination of whether other portions of
the governor's schedule were sufficiently related to his deliberative process as
governor to qualify for a privilege); see also Times Mirror, 813 P.2d at 251
(holding that the governor's past appointment books, calendars, and schedules
are exempt under the catch-all deliberative process provision of California
public records statute but not under a provision allowing him to withhold
"correspondence"). Additionally, see Jones, 895 S.W.2d at 7-8, where after
characterizing all open records appeals by the media as "fishing expedition[s]
upon which to base some speculative publication," the court cited Times Mirror
to support its holding that the governor's past schedule is a statutorily exempt
preliminary draft, stating that "while the raw material . . . is factual, its essence
is deliberative."
209. Of course, if the governor takes a Louisiana State Police helicopter to
get to his meeting destination, he must release that helicopter travel log, showing
the date and location of the trip, within seven days. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
44:5(E) (Supp. 2010). Governor Jindal complied with just such a request for a
news story about his frequent helicopter trips to attend church services across
the state. State police released the travel log, but the governor's office verified to
the newspaper the purpose of the trips. Marsha Shuler, Jindal Visits Churches
Across State, ADvOcATE (Baton Rouge, La.), Aug. 30, 2009, at IA. Section
44:5 does not appear to require the governor to explain the purpose behind the
trips. However, a governor is always free to share information, even if protected
under Revised Statutes section 44:5.
210. See Herald, 816 A.2d at 476 (remanding the case for a determination of
whether other portions of the governor's schedule were sufficiently related to his
deliberative process as governor to qualify for a privilege); see also Times
Mirror, 813 P.2d at 251.
211. See Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 816 F.2d 1114, 1119 (9th
Cir. 1988) ("[Tihe scope of the deliberative process privilege should not turn on
whether we label the contents of a document 'factual' as opposed to
'deliberative.' A legal standard that ties our judgment solely to the type of
information allegedly secreted in a document transforms our inquiry into a
semantics debate that ignores that the ultimate objective of exemption 5 is to
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Vaughn index requires the agency to disclose on the index the
identity of the author of a document. 2 12 It is contradictory to
require the disclosure of the author of a document-before
determining whether that document constitutes the deliberative
process-but to not require the disclosure of the name of a person
who may have offered the governor oral advice or
recommendations. Granted, the required disclosure of the author in
the Vaughn index context is designed to give the opposing court
and party an idea of the nature of the document.213 But if
disclosure in the Vaughn index context has been deemed not to go
so far as to disclose the internal, possibly protected nature of the
document in question-and therefore crossing the line into the
substance of the deliberative process-then disclosing the identity
of those with whom the governor meets should also not cross that
line.
Legislators in committee hearings seemed to worry that if the
public could find out with whom the governor had been meeting,
then the public would be confused. 2  This paternalistic attitude
runs counter to public's right to know.215 Additionally, as one
author has noted, because those in power generally seek to keep
secrets out of self-interest, the arguments in favor of secrecy
should be viewed skeptically. 2 16
safeguard the deliberative process of agencies, not the paperwork generated in
the course of that process." (citation omitted)).
212. Arthur Andersen & Co. v. IRS, 679 F.2d 254, 258 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see
also In re A Matter Under Investigation, 15 So. 3d 972 (La. 2009).
213. Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 824 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ("This lack of
knowledge of the party seeking disclosure seriously distorts the traditional
adversarial nature of our legal system's form of dispute resolution.").
214. "Just because I'm meeting with someone and they have an agenda
doesn't mean they influenced me. . . . It's easy for the public to go down that
road." Senate Hearing, supra note 4 (statement by state Senator Mike
Walsworth, member of the committee) (arguing that even though officials may
meet with people who have a known agenda, the meeting may still be private in
nature, not dealing with public business).
215. Id. (statement by Carl Redman, executive editor of the Baton Rouge
Advocate) ("With our [state's] checkered history, knowing who's meeting with
the governor goes to transparency. . . . What is the public purpose served by
hiding that?").
216. Wetlaufer, supra note 18, at 886 ("[T]here is a strong association
between secrecy and bad acts. Not that secrecy always entails a bad act, but that
bad acts always seek out secrecy. . . . [S]ecrecy operates to alienate-to create
subjective distance between-the secret keeper and the one from whom the
secret is kept. In the public sphere, such alienation between the governed and the
governors tends toward hierarchy and away from democracy and citizen
sovereignty." (footnote omitted)).
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Absent a change in this statutory language, however, future
Louisiana governors will be able to meet in secret with whomever
they wish." Why might a lobbyist submit any written
communication offering her advice to the governor on an issue,
running the risk the communication be made public, when a face-
to-face meeting could be held in complete anonymity? It is
important to remember that although a current governor may be
popular, this statute will apply to all governors who, given
Louisiana's history, just might include some scoundrels.
F. The Governor Must Archive All Records
Historically speaking, the old blanket exemption meant that the
governor's office had no clear obligation to preserve its records.218
But the enactment of Act 495, requiring the governor's compliance
with public records law,219 raises interesting questions. What must
happen to those previously disposable documents, and who gets to
decide whether a document is preserved or destroyed?
217. The issue of what a governor has been doing with his time came up
recently in South Carolina. Gina Smith & John O'Connor, Sanford's Office
Couldn't Locate Missing Governor, STATE (Columbia, S.C.), July 14, 2009,
available at http://www.thestate.com/2009/07/14/862957/sanfords-office-
couldnt-locate.html. It took a public records request to get emails between the
governor and his staff for the media to tell the story about the strange behavior
of South Carolina Governor Mark Sanford, who later admitted to travelling to
South America to carry on an extramarital affair. In Louisiana, under the current
version of Section 44:5, those emails would likely be protected as intra-office
communications and possibly, if they dealt with the governor's whereabouts,
could be protected as scheduling information as well. However, an argument
could be made that trips to South America not involving trade missions might
constitute an activity not involved with the "usual course of the duties and
business" of the governor. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44:5(A) (Supp. 2010).
218. House Hearing, supra note 83 (statement of David Woolridge, attorney
for the Louisiana Press Association) (saying that past governors could simply
shred records or toss them into the garbage can). Governors and state officials
are required by statute to transfer to State Archives records or "associated
historical materials" when the official leaves office, though the statute further
exempts records deemed by that official to be "essential for the continued
efficient operation of the relevant governmental office" and "demonstrably
personal and private papers." LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44:417(A) (2007).
219. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44:36(A) ("All persons and public bodies having
custody . . . of any public record . . . shall exercise diligence and care in
preserving the public record for the period ... of time specified ... in formal
records retention schedules. . . . However, in all instances in which a formal
retention schedule has not been executed, such public records shall be preserved
and maintained for a period of at least three years from the date on which the
public record was made.").
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Generally, Louisiana public records must be preserved
according to a "records retention schedule" developed by the state
archivist. 20 In the absence of a schedule, records must be kept at
least three years. 22 1 State Archives recommends to departments
drafting records retention plans that the department keep certain
documents forever and transfer them to State Archives.2 Those
archive documents include administrative correspondence,
memoranda, and emails that reflect the organization of the office;
its "pattern of action and decision-making"; its policies and
procedures; and records that "serve to substantiate the
accountability of the office." 223 State Archives recommends
destroying after three years only correspondence that is "obviously
routine" and involves no agency decision.224 State Archives even
recommends that working papers, studies, preliminary drafts, and
interim reports that result in a final report be kept one year by the
department, with the final report resulting from those documents
being transferred to State Archives.22 5 When filling out the
standard records retention form, agencies can suggest which
specific records may be confidential and what provision of law
makes it so.226
The retention requirements and suggestions may appear to
conflict with the provisions of Act 495. This incongruence makes
sense-State Archives developed these procedures before anything
like the deliberative process privilege existed in Louisiana public
records law. 2 27 A recommendation to retain forever those
documents that reflect decision-making would not have been
counter to public records law as it existed before the summer of
2009, but now that recommendation seems to directly conflict with
the deliberative process privilege's protection of the decision-
making process.
To illustrate this new contradiction, consider the decision of an
agency head made after consulting a series of studies and
220. Id State Archives is a division of the Louisiana Secretary of State's
office. The Louisiana Secretary of State is a statewide elected official, not
appointed by the governor.
221. Id
222. La. Secretary of State, Advice on the Disposition of Selected Records
(on file with author).
223. Id.
224. Id
225. Id
226. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44:405(A)(3) (2007); see also State Archives
Form SS ARC 932 (2007), available at http://www.sos.louisiana.gov/Portals/
0/archives/forms/arc-932_newsample.pdf.
227. Indeed, State Archives treats "deliberative process" information as
particularly important to preserve. La. Secretary of State, supra note 222.
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recommendations made by in-house experts. Under State
Archives' recommendations, the agency should archive that
background information, as it would "serve to substantiate the
accountability of the office" or because it would reflect the
"pattern of decision-making" in that agency. 228 But the same study
or recommendation used by a governor to inform his decision to
issue an executive order would seem to be offered some protection
under the deliberative process privilege. But just because a
governor might not have to hand over that information to a
requester does not mean that the governor would not have to
comply with archive requirements.
However, that seems to have been the position of then-
Executive Counsel to the Governor, Jimmy Faircloth Jr., when he
testified in front of the House Committee on House and
Governmental Affairs in support of Act 495. Regarding archive
requirements, Faircloth said that the governor's records would be
designated as either exempted by deliberative process or not, and
those not exempted would be archived.229 It is conceded that for a
governor to archive any records at all is indeed a historic shift in
the direction of transparency. 230 But the governor's office should
not be given the authority to, in effect, assert the deliberative
process privilege before someone has requested a record and
before a court has been given an opportunity to make the final
determination. Requiring the archiving of potentially confidential
information already takes place in other areas of government. Even
government records that contain information indisputably
confidential are still retained by State Archives for a period of
time, with a notation that they may contain confidential
information. 31 Additionally, because deliberative process is such a
subjective test, allowing a governor to make his own judgment
presents an obvious conflict of interest.232
228. Id.
229. House Hearing, supra note 83 (Faircloth testimony).
230. During testimony, archivist Tara Laver bemoaned the loss of records of
colorful Louisiana governors like Governor Edwin Edwards. The study of
history would have been better served had those records been archived, Laver
said. Id. (Laver testimony).
231. See, e.g., Div. of Admin., Records Retention Schedule for Office of
Group Benefits (on file with author) (noting that "legal files" likely to contain
attorney-client privileged information are maintained by State Archives for 10
years after they are no longer active, with a notation that the files "may contain
confidential information"). Other examples of documents containing
confidential information, but still retained by state archives for a period of time,
include employee W-2 forms and computer security information.
232. Wetlaufer, supra note 18, at 892-93 ("[E]xecutive secrecy operates to
disempower citizens by depriving them of the information that they may need in
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The governor's office has yet to finalize its retention schedule.
But when it does, that retention schedule should account for the
archiving of all records in the governor's office, whether the
records may contain information a court might later determine
constituted privileged information. A system of two separate
files-one to archive, one to withhold from archives-should not
exist under Louisiana public records law.
The problem with such a system is that it would allow a
governor to make an independent determination of what constitutes
privileged information. The basic premise of Louisiana public
records doctrine is that all records generated by the government are
public records unless they fall squarely within a statutory
exemption. Especially with a broad, subjective exemption like the
deliberative process privilege, it is vital that all documents be
archived with sufficient detail to allow a requester to identify their
nature and the specific exemption being asserted.233 With an in
camera review mechanism already in place-and with the
possibility that courts could further impose a Vaughn-like index
requirement--courts should be making final determinations, not
the governor's office.
Requiring all records to be archived for posterity would still
allow the governor's office to claim a privilege when, if ever,
someone sought to have those documents released. Indeed, the
current archive system allows for agencies to label a record as
containing potentially confidential information. 234 If a request is
made, the governor's office would still have a chance to assert a
privilege.
Another issue involving archiving the governor's records is
how long those records must be retained. California requires
governors to archive materials when leaving office, but certain
order to effectively promote their interests. . . . Additionally, the establishment
of the general deliberative privilege will operate to diminish the sense of
accountability under which executive officials do their business. That
diminished sense of accountability may increase the likelihood that the official
will act in a way that is sloppy or incompetent, that he will confuse his own self-
interest (or that of a particular constituency) with the interests of the public, or
that he will engage in various kinds of bad acts with which he would not want to
be publicly associated.").
233. State Archives already suggests that documents serving to illuminate the
decision-making process of that agency should be retained, not discarded.
Although only the governor's office can claim a privilege over such documents,
labeling the documents as part of the deliberative process is possible, and
advisable, under current State Archive policies. La. Secretary of State, supra
note 222.
234. Id.
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records can be withheld from public view for 50 years or, if the
governor is still alive after 50 years, upon that governor's death.235
The Vermont Supreme Court endorsed an agreement between
Governor Howard Dean and the Vermont Secretary of State that
placed a 10-year limit on the release of archived information Dean
deemed as privileged.236 One court has noted that as more time
passes, the more likely that a privilege against disclosure serves no
real purpose.237
In Louisiana, the State Senate shot down an amendment that
would have required records subject to the deliberative process
privilege and intra-office communications exemption to be
archived and subject to disclosure 10 years from the day the
document was generated.238 This could suggest that the Senate did
not intend to require the governor to archive information he deems
privileged or that State Archives would later work out the
appropriate time horizon for release. The defeat could merely
signal that the Senate found the measure unnecessary and
duplicative of already-existing and applicable archive
requirements. Either way, the defeat of the amendment means the
legislature has given no statutory direction to the governor
regarding archival requirements. Absent specific direction, the
more general statutory archival requirements should apply. The
governor must archive all records but is free to label as
confidential those that may constitute deliberative process material
and then assert a privilege if the record is later requested.239
Archive requirements, the governor's schedule, an intra-office
exemption, and new privileges-Section 44:5 is the result of an
ambitious attempt to completely rework an important area of
public records law. But the potentially inconsistent interpretations
and the introduction of a new subjective test like the deliberative
process privilege risk turning an attempt to promote transparency
into a shield against healthy government disclosure. Given a
government's natural inclination against openness, regardless of
what individual holds the reins of power, Louisiana legislators
should consider Section 44:5 as a work in progress. In the
235. CAL. Gov. CODE § 6268 (West 2008).
236. Judicial Watch, Inc. v. State, 892 A.2d 191 (Vt. 2005).
237. See United States v. Ahmad, 499 F.2d 851, 855 (3d Cir. 1974), a case
dealing with executive privilege and state secrets, where the court noted that
"[t]he passage of time has a profound effect upon such matters, and that which is
of utmost sensitivity one day may fade into nothing more than interesting history
within weeks or months."
238. Senate Floor Amendment No. 1576, 2009 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. May 20,
2009).
239. La. Secretary of State, supra note 222.
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meantime, while the relative newness of many of Section 44:5's
provisions are the cause of some of its critics' consternation-e.g.,
the subjective deliberative process privilege-that same newness
also frees Louisiana courts to fashion some of the solutions
presented here and hold fast to Louisiana's traditional, laudable,
and constitutionally recognized policy of open government.
V. CONCLUSION
Though for the last 60 years the law shielded the Louisiana
governor from the public records fray, if recent history is a good
indication, another battle over the governor's public records is
inevitable. For the first time, the governor is required to join the
public records fight-even if armed with a statute that allows the
governor to bring a gun to a knife fight. Unless the legislature
changes the rules, courts will have to step in to referee in a manner
most protective of the public's right to know. When they do so,
courts should keep in mind the history of strict construction given
to assertions of exemptions under public records law.
Courts are free to, and should, adopt a definition of deliberative
process that protects communications only before the governor
makes a decision. Courts need to implement procedures to ensure
that those seeking records will be given a meaningful opportunity
to dispute the governor's assertion of a privilege. Further, courts
should not allow anyone other than the governor to claim the
deliberative process privilege. In addition, although the legislature
likely intended to allow the governor to withhold both past and
future scheduling information, public policy is better served by a
legislative amendment to open up past scheduling information.
Courts must strictly adhere to the six-month budgetary privilege
provision by requiring that when the governor seeks to withhold
budgetary information, those records be "limited to" pre-decisional
advice and not merely factual material or conclusions. Finally, the
governor should be required to submit records to State Archives in
a way that will preserve for history the inner workings of the
state's most powerful position.
Overall, the legislature needs to revisit the possible
ramifications of Act 495. A good start would be to adopt
Representative Wayne Waddel's suggestion to convene a
committee to study the new law's impact.240 In the long run, a
government overly concerned with covering its tracks and
240. See H.R. 127, 2009 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2009), which would have led
to a study of the "impact and effect" of Revised Statutes section 44:5. The
resolution died after failing to make it to a House floor vote.
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shielding its internal practices from public view will fail the public.
That government will ultimately falter, not because the public
found out too much about what goes on behind closed doors, but
because the public found out too late to force the government to
change direction.24 ' A self-governing democracy can thrive only
when given its direction by a well-informed citizenry.
Kevin M Blanchard
241. See supra note 232.
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